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17. Cansultants* To discuss this provision, click here. A consuitantk may not represent a person or entity other than the city in any matter, transaction, action, or proceeding in whic the consultant participated personally and substantially as a consultant to the city. Nor may a consultant represent a person or entty in any matter, transaction, action, or proceeding against the interest of the city. Comment: Other rules that apply expressly to consultants are 100(8) (Confidential Information), 100(21) (Honesty in Applicati n for Positions), and 101(2) (Transactional Disclosure). Also see the comments to 100(11), the revolving door provision. Many codes also include language such as: A consultant may not accept other employment that will either impair the consulta t's independence of judgment with respect to the consultant's official duties for the city, or that will require or induce the consulta to disclose confidential information pursuant to subsection 8 of this section. The same problem appears as in the comments to 100 (1) above: how does one know or prove that employment will impair someone's judgment or induce someone to disclose confidential information? lt is enough that consultants are prevenied from representing parties against the ciry or in matters th city hired them to deal with, and ihat they be included in the confidential information provision, 100(4). 18. Complicity with or Knowledge of flthers' Violations To discuss this provision, click here. No one may, directly or indirectly, induce, encourage, or aid anyone to violate any provision of this code. If an officiai or empla ee* suspects that someone has violated this code, he or she is required to report it to the relevant individual, either the employee' supervisor, the board on which the official sits or before which the officiai or employee* is appearing* or wiil soon appear, or th Ethics Commission if the violation is past or if it is not immediately relevant to a decision, to discussion, or to actions or transactions. Anyone who reports a violation in good faith will be protected by the provisions of 110. Comment: This subsection seems to turn all city officials and employees into stool pigeons. But, in fact, a principal reason wh ethics programs are ineffective is that otficials and employees feel they can get away with unethical conduct because no one ill turn them in. Instead of having a culture based on efhics, their city has a culture based on loyalty. People in such a city ignore confiicts of interest, because they feel protected. There are two reasons for this: (i) no one wants to be a tattle-tale and (ii) everyone is afraid to be a tattle-tale, because doing so might threaten their jobs, lead to harassmeni and failure to advance, o undermine their relations with people in power. This subsection, along with the whistle-biower protection in 110, allows the people who know most what is going on in ciry government - city employees - to safely foster an ethical environment by preventing action in the public interest from being ag insi their self-interest. The inclusion of ihis provision makes it clear to all officials and employees that government ethics is a grou activity, that unethical behavior is less an individual problem than an organizational problem. Such a provision appears in the IMLA Model Code; the comments to the IMLA provision state, in part, "Even if a community uliimately decides not to impose any duty [to reporf violations], it would be beiter off for having debated the issue. " Whether or not anonymous reports would be accepted is another area for debate. Creating a hotline for reports of violation (anonymously or not) makes it easier for city employees and others to fulfill their duty to report violations. As long as the ethic commission can file its own complaint in such an instance, there is the protection for respondents that the ethics commission ust feel satisfied, after a preliminary investigation, in the truth of the report. People's experiences with such hotlines, good and ba , would be very helpful, as would information about debates about the duty to report and about hotlines and anonymous reporti g of violations. Back to tattling, which is rarely defended in a rational way. Not tattling is something very important in childhood, where it help maintain solidarity of children against adults. But for adults there is not a group to maintain solidarity against (hopefully not th city's residents, to whom officials have a fiduciary duty) and, iherefore, this sort of unquestioning loyalry is inappropriate. The est thing to do, before reporting, is to try to prevent uneihical conduct before it occurs, to directly recommend, for example, that someone recuse himself or herself or seek advice from the ethics commission. But it is important that officials and employees know that unethical conduci will not be protected by the silence of fear or misplaced loyalty. The first sentence of this subsection, on complicity and inducement, is equally important. Under most ethics codes, a private citizen or company that induces a municipal official to violate ethics laws runs no risk of penalty. For example, hoping fo keep city's business, a bank might give a personal loan to the city treasurer at a below-market interest rate. If this loan is discovere , the official might lose his or her job as a result; however, the bank will lose nothing and, more important, knowing this, it is mo e likely to offer the loan. Since the goal of this code is to prevent conflicts between the official's interests and the public interest, it is important that the code also make it less likely that officials are tempted into these conflicts. Please share your experiences w th provisions such as this, including instances where suiis have been brought, arguing that ethics commissions have no jurisdicton over anyone other than public servants. 19. Faisely Impugning Reputation To discuss this provision, click here. An afficial or empioyee* may not falsely impugn the reputation of a city resident. if an official or empioyee* believes his or her accusation to be true, and then learns that it was false, even in part, he or she should apologize in the same forum the accusations were made. A failure to so apologize within a reasonable period of time after learning of the falseness of the accusations will create the presumption that the conduct was fully intentional. Comment: A common way for officials to intimidate residents who speak out and to prevent others from similarly speaking ou to use their positions of respect to falsely attack people who lack such positions, and thereby destroy their reputation and the legitimacy of their arguments, so that opposition from that individual and others wili lessen. This form of misuse of office is cer to undermining free debate as well as citizen oversight of executive and legisiative actions. 20. Meeting Attendance To discuss this provision, click here. All members of boards and commissions are expected to attend and be prepared for meetings. It is a violation of this code to or come unprepared to more than a third of a board or commission's meetings in a twelve-month period. Comment: If a member must miss or come unprepared for more than a small number of ineetings, he or she shouid resign, whether or not his or her reasons are good ones. One can always ask to return to a position when one's health or schedule h improved. 41