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07-G Senate Bill 7
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07-G Senate Bill 7
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Last modified
11/8/2005 11:20:50 AM
Creation date
2/5/2003 10:56:28 PM
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AGENDA
Item Number
7G
AGENDA - Type
RESOLUTION
Description
Senate Bill 7 Endorsement
AGENDA - Date
2/10/2003
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As Functional Markets Develop Within ERCOT Zones, Market <br />Power Concerns Become More Apparent. <br /> <br /> CAPP and STAP Cities' primary long-term concern is that the retail market power in <br />Texas is not sufficiemly diffused among enough players to create a truly competitive market. <br />The absence of numerous strong market players means that competitive forces cannot keep <br />prices in check and unregulated monopolies will develop. The June bankruptcy filing of New <br />Power, Inc., a residential REP created by Enron, reinforced the view that marketing to small <br />accounts is developing only among a very few REPs. Prior to declaring bankruptcy and <br />abandoning the Texas retail market, New Power, Inc. was the most successful residential REP <br />not affiliated with an incumbent utility. After its departure, few independent REPs remain to <br />compete for customers based on price. <br /> <br />Few Competitive Offers Exist, Even for Desirable Load. <br /> <br /> The limited number of competitive options available is evident to CAPP and STAP. In <br />theory, the aggregated city load represented by CAPP and STAP should be extremely attractive <br />to the competitive market. Municipal load is characterized by substantial, consistent usage, <br />including desirable off-peak usage. Strong load diversity exists. In addition, considerable <br />opportunities were available for expanded services. Yet even with all of these desirable <br />characteristics, CAPP received only four bids in response to its Request for Proposal for 2003 <br />service that was sent to 13 potential providers. Of the four bids - all submitted by REPs that <br />were affiliated in some way with incumbent providers - only two bidders submitted proposals to <br />meet all of the requirements of CAPP's request. The price differential for the energy portion of <br />the potential supply agreement bids was amazingly slim. All of the bids were for prices higher <br />than had been agreed to in the power contract for 2002. Initially, there was a 12.5 percent <br />differential in indicative bids. As negotiations continued, energy prices rose 6 percent. The <br />price differential between bidders then narrowed to 6 percent. CAPP's experience indicates that <br />the REPs are all focusing on the same pricing parameters emanating from daily weather patterns <br />and natural gas futures. Whether the customer is an aggregator seeking service for diversified <br />load or a small commercial customer, it is clear that there are few creative or attractive price <br />offerings in the current market. If retail service offers continue along this path, then <br />restructuring has simply given customers a choice among pre-existing, unregulated monopolies. <br /> <br /> The Statute Inadequately Addresses Market Power Control Within ERCOT <br /> Zones. <br /> <br /> While the original deregulation legislation contains some protection against market <br /> power by mandating that no entity control more than 20 percent of generation within a market, <br /> that intent has been frustrated by the development of functional markets inconsistent with the <br /> theoretical market envisioned by SB7. Prior to January 1, 2002, the relevant market was thought <br /> to be ERCOT. However, in reality, ERCOT rules and practice have created multiple zones with <br /> additional charges for power flowing between zones during periods of transmission congestion. <br /> Each zone has, in practice, become a distinct market, particularly in times of congestion. As a <br /> result, one affiliate of an incumbent utility has significant market dominance in several zones. <br /> <br /> 1813\O0~mao~mo030113grog 16 <br /> <br /> <br />
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