10-Presentation of the annual report on racial profiling policy

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This methodological error, commonly referred to as the "ecological fallacy," defines the dangers involved in making assertions about individual officer decisions based on the examination of aggregate incident level data. In short, one cannot "prove" that an individual officer has "racially profiled" any individual motorist based on the rate at which a department stops any given group of motorists. Additional interpretation problems remain in regards to the specific measurement of "racia] profiling" as defined by Texas state code. For example, officers are currently forced to make subjective determinations regarding an individual's race based on his or her personal observations because the Texas Department of Public Safety does not provide an objectively- based determination of an individual's race/ethnicity on the Texas driver's license. The absence of any verifiable race/ethnicity data on the driver's license is especially troubling given the racial diversity within the city of Paris. The validity of any racial/ethnic disparities discovered in the aggregate level data becomes threatened in direct proportion to the number of subjective "guesses" officers are forced to make when trying to determine an individual's racial/ethnic background. In addition, the data collected for the current report does not allow for an analysis that separates (or disaggregates) the discretionary decisions of officers to stop a motorist from those that are largely non-discretionary. For example, non-discretionary stops of motorists based on the discovery of outstanding warrants should not be analyzed in terms of whether or not "profiling" has occurred simply because the officer who has stopped a motorist as a result of the discovery of an outstanding warrant does not independently make the decision to stop, but rather, is required to stop that individual regardless of any determination of race. An officer cannot be determined to be "racially profiling" when organizational rules and state codes compel them to stop regardless of an individual's race/ethnicity. Straightforward aggregate comparisons of stop rates ignore these realities, and fail to distinguish between discretionary and non-discretionary ]aw enforcement actions. In the future, this validity issue could be lessened by the collection of data indicating the initial reason for the traffic stop, whether it be an observed traffic violation, other criminal activity, the existence of an outstanding warrant, or some other reason. Finally, there has been considerable debate as to what the most appropriate population "base- rate" is in determining whether or not racial/ethnic disparities exist. As the current analysis shows in regards to the use of city and county population base-rates, the outcome of analyses designed to determine whether or not disparities exist is obviously dependent on which base-rate is used. In addition, recent population changes in the city of Paris exacerbates problems associated with determining appropriate base-rates because measures derived exclusively from the U.S. census can become quickly outdated since they are compiled only once per decade. Moreover, the determination of valid stop base-rates becomes multiplied if analyses fail to distinguish between residents and non-residents who are stopped, because the existence of significant proportions of non-resident stops will lead to invalid conclusions if racial/ethnic comparisons are made exclusively to resident population figures. In short, the methodological problems outlined above point to the limited utility of using aggregate level comparisons of the rates at which different racial/ethnic groups are cited in order to determine whether ar not racial profiling exists within a given jurisdiction. 6 " 1s'0t1 17J