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Clarification Of Quantification Of Economic Benefit <br /> <br /> Under retail electric deregulation effective January 1, 2002 there are two basic types of <br />electric accounts, those that are covered by price to beat (PTB)~ and those that are not. A retail <br />electric provider affiliated with the incumbent utility company can only offer service to PTB <br />eligible accounts at the price to beat rate, adjusted for fuel costs. Non-PTB accounts may be <br />charged whatever the supplier and customer agree upon. However, the retail electric provider <br />(REP) must recover non-bypassable charges that will be imposed by the transmission and <br />distribution utility pursuant to Commission Order if the competitive REP intends to make a <br />profit. A specific price quote may be economically beneficial to some PTB accounts and not <br />others dependent upon what tariff the Commission requires for se~Mce to a particular account <br />and what non-bypassable charges a REP will have to pay to provide se~ice to customers on that <br />tariff <br /> <br /> Each city has a unique combination of accounts and a unique combination of PTB and <br />non-PTB load. The evaluation of economic benefit involves analyzing future PTB rates and <br />projected non-PTB rates of the incumbent provider (affiliated REP) against rates to be applied <br />under aggregation. It is CAPP's goal to confirm that cities are economically better off under the <br />aggregation project than they would be if they did nothing and remained under the PTB rates and <br />the standard offer for non-PTB rates. While CAPP is unique among aggregation projects in that <br />regard, CAPP consukants intend to take the analysis a step further. Not content that aggregation <br />of CAPP's entire load produces total savings or even savings for each city when compared to <br />doing nothing, CAPP's consultants w'dl attempt to isolate specific accounts that individually <br />produce negative savings (despite overall positive savings) and to negotiate with the winning <br />bidder to remove those accounts from the aggregated load, so that those accounts can remain <br />under PTB. Furthermore, CAPP had secured bids that permit separate evaluation of PTB and <br />non-PTB load so that even if economic analysis provides that it is best for an individual city to <br />leave some or all its PTB eligible accounts with the affiliated provider of the incumbent utility, <br />that city will still have an aggregation option for its non-PTB accounts. <br /> <br /> The CAPP load in the initial request for proposal exceeds 700 million kWh annually. It <br />involves approximately 7000 electric accounts. Thorough economic analysis requires an <br />understanding of where existing accounts will be consolidated under new rate designations, as <br />well as an understanding of how price to beat will be calculated. Based upon existing <br />information, CAPP consultants have confirmed that several bids will produce total savings when <br />measured against the current understanding of the price to beat. The challenge now is to increase <br />the savings by removing accounts that would be better off under PTB and to protect and <br />hopefully increase savings by maintaining flexibility to react to changing market conditions and <br />Commission Orders. CAPP appreciates your patience and cooperation. <br /> <br />Under SB 7 passed in 1999, PTB is to be a 6 percent reduction to the bundled (fuel and base rates) price <br />in effect in January 1999, adjusted for fuel costs. Because fuel costs increased significantly in 2000- <br />2001, it is unlikely any PTB customer will realize a savings from 1999 rates. <br /> <br /> <br />